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NON-CONFORMING POLITICAL OPINION AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: TRANSNATIONAL PROTECTION
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION*
Myres S. McDougal,** Harold D. Lasswell***
and Lung-chu Chen****
In a world arena characterized by persisting expectations of violence and a concomitant trend toward politicization, there has been a deepening community concern for
outlawing intolerance toward non-conformists. Expectations of violence and perception of crisis within a particular territorial community often lead to the mobilization of
,group defenses, with ruthless suppression of dissident views
and discrimination against the holders of such views. The
concern of the larger community both builds upon and expresses a more general norm of nondiscrimination which seeks
to forbid all generic differentiations among human beings
in the shaping and sharing of values for reasons irrelevant
to individual capabilities and contribution. 1 The particular norm against discrimination on the ground of nonconforming opinion finds expression in many authoritative
communications, at both transnational and national levels,
and, under appropriate conditions, could be made an important bulwark for the protection of political freedom.
*Copyright retained by Myres S. McDougal, Harold D.
Lasswell, and Lung-chu Chen. This article is excerpted
from a book, Human Rights and World Public Order, the authors have in progress. The authors gratefully acknowledge
the criticism and comments of Professors Thomas I. Emerson
and W. Michael Reisman. The Ralph E. Ogden Foundation has
been generous in its support of the studies from which
this article is drawn.
**Sterling Professor of Law, Emeritus, Yale Law School.
***Ford Foundation Professor of Law and Social Sciences,
Emeritus, Yale Law School.
****Senior Research Associate, Yale Law School.
I. For a detailed elaboration of the general norm of
nondiscrimination, see McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, "The Protection of Respect and Human Rights: Freedom of Choice and
World Public Order," 24 Am. U. L. Rev. No. 4 (Summer 1975);
McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, "Human Rights for Women and
World Public Order: The Outlawing of Sex-Based Discrimination," 69 AJIL 497 (1975).
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I. Factual Background
The deprivations to which reference is here made are
those imposed upon individuals characterized in terms of
their political or other opinions. Manifestations of Intolerance toward "political" heretics, as toward religious,
have long historical roots. In the earliest days there
could of course be no distinction between discriminations
on the ground of religious and political beliefs since the
organized community and the established religion were largely one and the same and little or no difference was made between religion and law. 2 In more modern times, while intolerance toward religious non-conformists has waned, intolerance toward political non-conformists has significantly waxed, especially with the rise in the twentieth century
of totalitarian regimes. 3 The political or other opinions
that are frequently made ground for discrimination include
a broad spectrum of articulated views on power and the other
components of social process. As with religious discriminations, deprivations may be imposed upon an individual because he refuses to accept an established political orthodoxy, or adheres to a different set of political prefer2. Cf. Bertholet, "Religion," 13 Encyc. Soc. Sc. 228,
229-31 (ETSeligman ed. 1934).
3. On totalitarianism, see generally H. Arendt, The
Origins of Totalitarianism (195-3); K. Bracher, The German
Dictatorship (1970); H. Buchheim, Totalitarian Rule: Its
Nature and Characteristics (R. Iein transl. 1968); B. Chapman, Police State (1970); C. Friedrich & Z. Brzezinski,
Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (1961); C. Friedrich, H. Curtis, & B. Barber, Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views (1969); E. Fromm, Escape from Freedom
(1941; 1965); F. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (1944);
S. Neumann, Permanent Revolution: Totalitarianism in the
Age of International Civil War ( Tded. 1965); W. Reich,
The Mass Psychology of Fascism (1946); L. Schapiro, Totalitarianism (1972); J. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitaran
Democracy (1960); E. Tannenbaum, The Fascist Experience:
Italian Society and Culture 1922-l145 ('1972); Totalit-ar-Ianism (C. Friedrich ed. 1964); WorldRIvolutionary Elites:
Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (H. LassveTF&
D. Lerner eds. 1966).
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ences, or expresses doubts about existing systems, or attempts peacefully to evangelize for a new set of preferences, or openly impugns the validity of prevailing systems. While dissenters in the power sector are the primary targets of deprivation, non-conformists in sectors
other than power are by no means immune from discriminatory deprivations: witness the treatment accorded in recent years to the hippies, flower children, and others who
have espoused counter-cultures in their search for distinct
life styles and new modalities of interpersonal and social
4
relationships.
The history of deprivations imposed because of political or other opinion is vividly registered in the rise and
fall of practically every known body politic. While it is
true that most deprivations are imposed through community
processes of authoritative decision, some measures are direct expressions of unauthorized though tolerated effecImpositions range from minor irritation and
tive power.
harassment to torture and death. The danger to a.public
order of human dignity of deprivations of this kind, which
know no national or ideological boundaries, is of course
immense. Characterizing the 1970s "not as a golden Space
5
Age, but rather as a new era of political barbarism,"
Shelton has sharply observed:
Most amazingly, the ninety countries known to
hold political prisoners run across all sociopolitical lines. There Is nearly as much use
for the jaildr of ideas in the "free world"
as there is in the Communist bloc. The supposedly idealistic emergent group of Third
World nations is not only not immune to the
4. Power is a function of perspectives and operations in all other value processes. Hence the preferences
of elites for a general orthodoxy.
On Counter-culture, see two contemporary classics:
T. Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture (1969); C. Reich,
See also Counter Culture
The Greening of America (1970).
(J. Berke ed. 1969); R. Johnson, Counter Culture and the
Vision of God (1971).
5. Shelton, "The Geography of Disgrace: A World Survey of Political Prisoners," Saturday Review/World, June 15,

1974, 14, at 14.

4
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jailing fever but also is in fact heavily
into the business of locking up dissenters.
In many such nations, to paraphrase the
German military theoretician Karl von
Clausewitz, the imprisonment of dissenters
is simply the continuation of state policy
6
by other means.
The analysis of political deprivations may well begin
with enlightenment as a value base of power. We refer to
denials of or restrictions upon individual participation
in articulating and expressing opinions. Non-conformists
may, when political orthodoxy is made decisive, be denied
access to the media of mass communication and to institutions of higher learning, not only as channels through
which to express their views, but as means of obtaining
knowledge of the views of others.7 A blanket prohibition
may be levied against the formation of al-ternative or competing channels and institutions. Dissent may, therefore,
be suppressed by monopolizing and exploiting all media of
public expression, eclipsed by an educational regime of
systematic indoctrination, and policed by routinized or
sporadic recourse to coercion.8 In communities exhibiting
6. Id.
7. lC. Ammoun, Study of Discrimination in Education
60-61, 65, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/181/Rev.l (1957).
8. Cf. T. Chen, Thought Reform of the Chinese IntellectuaTs (1960);A. Dallin & G. Breslauer, Political
Terror in Communist Syste
(1970); J. Hazard, The Soviet
System of Government (1957); International Press Institute,
The Press in Authoritarian Countries (1959); R. Lifton,
Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of
"Brainwashing" in China (1963); S. Neumann, supra note 2,
at 205-29.
"A totalitarian government will naturally organize a totalitarian educational system. In Nazi Germany,
the objectives of Aryan or Nordic supremacy were applied in
such a way as to deprive Jews and other non-Aryans of access to higher education, as well as to persecute them in
countless ways. The authorities of Fascist Italy imposed
their political credo--'Believe, obey, fight!' and
'Mussolini is always right!'--upon all pupils and students
and monopolized all media of public expression. The rules
of the U.S.S.R. prohibit the teaching of religion, nonMarxian economics, and other doctrines deemed to be incon-
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high degrees of political intolerance, as in a totalitarian
state, it is commonplace that
Nonconformity of opinion is treated as the
equivalent of resistance or opposition to
the government, and a formidable apparatus
of compulsion, including various kinds of
state police or secret police, is kept in
being to enforce the orthodoxy of the proclaimed doctrines of the state. 9
For political non-conformists deprivations of power
are especially severe. Non-conformists are commonly denied access to appointive and elective public office, notably where one-party rule prevails. 1 0 In a body politic
sistent with Communist ideology. Nations officially committed to the principles of democratic government and life
tend to reveal a more pluralistic attitude toward other
viewpoints and peoples." "Education, Systems of," 6 Encyc.
Brit. 417, 418 (15th ed. 1974).
9. "Political Systems," 14 Encyc. Brit. 707, 715
(15th ed. 1974).
"[I]n a totalitarian state, in which only one
party is permitted, views opposed to the policy of that
party are necessarily and permanently opposed to the government and are therefore regarded as being opposed to the
state. In a multiparty state, an opposition party that has
a reasonable opportunity of gaining power in the future
will not see its conflict with the government as a conflict
with the state." "State, The" 17 Encyc. Brit. 609, 614
(15th ed. 1974).
In a non-totalitarian context, cf. A. Wolfe, The
Seaming Side of Democracy: Repression in America (1973TPreston, "Shadows of War and Fear," in The Pulse of Freedom 105-53 (1975) (A. Reitman ed.); Preston, "The 1940s:
The Way We Really Were," 2 Civil Liberties Rev. No. 1, at

4-38 (Winter, 1975).
10. Conversely, in many one-party states, especially
Communist, elections become an instrument to demonstrate
the unity of the people, and to generate (or, fabricate)
their "unanimous" support and fortify their identification
with the regime in power. As voting is thus conceived as
a test of loyalty, non-voting, though not proscribed by
law, may entail severe deprivations.

YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER

. [VOL.2

with de jure or de facto one party rule, the party identification, party m-e-meihp and loyalty are the required
credentials for governmental positions, high or low.'1
Even if non-members of the ruling party are allowed to compete for elective office, the opportunity Is entirely nominal, since coercion, fraud, and related methods of harassment preclude any chance of success. 12 Typically, dissenters are forbidden to organize political parties and other
associations. 1 3 They may be barred from holding meetings
11. "A single party, centrally directed and composed
exclusively of loyal supporters of the regime, is the other
typical feature of totalitarianism. The party is at once
an instrument of social control, a vehicle for ideological
indoctrination, and the body from which the ruling group
recruits its members." "Political Systems," supra note 9,
at 715. Cf. also M. Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of
the Communist System (1957); C. Friedrich & Z. Brzezinski,
supra note 3, at 27-47; J. Hazard, supra note 8, at 12-73;
S. Neumann, supra note 3, at 118-T41; F. Schurmann, Ideology
and Organization in Communist China (2d ed., enlarged 1968);
R. SWlomon, Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture 160-242 (1971); World Revolutionary Elites, supra

note 3.
12. For an illustration, see the practice of the Nationalist Chinese regime in Taiwan: Axelbank, "Chiang Kalshek's Silent Enemies," Harper's Magazine, September 1963,
at 46-53; The Economist, May 11, 1963, at 536. Cf. also
L. Chen & H. Lasswell, Formosa, China and the UnTted Nations 132-36, 151, T64-65,-70-73, 251-53, 275-82 (1967).
13. See C. Friedrich & Z. Brzezinski, supra note 3,
at 27-39; H- Santa Cruz, Study of Discrimination in the
Matter of Political Rights 37-38, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
213/Rev.l (1962). Cf. also generally Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society:_The ynamicsof Established OneParty Systems (S. Huntington & C. Moore eds. 1970); Regimes
and Oppositions (R. Dahl ed. 1973); and compare with
Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (R. Dahl ed.
1966).
Dahl has sharply observed "a self-fulfilling
prophecy" of "the hegemonic regime" in these terms: "Since
all opposition is potentially dangerous, no distinction can
be made between acceptable and unacceptable opposition, between loyal and disloyal opposition, between opposition that
is protected and opposition that must be repressed. Yet if
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and assemblies.1 4 They may be put into isolation or banished to remote areas. Often they are denied opportunity
to go abroad, either temporarily or permanently.15 Conversely, non-conformists may return to their own land at
their peril.
In extreme cases dissenters may be deprived
of nationality and banished abroad. 16 To an increasing extent political refugees of today have taken the place formerly occupied by religious refugees.1 7 For non-conformers
in general due process of law is a luxury: arbitrary arrest, detention, trial (or non-trial), and imprisonment are
the trademarks of contemporary political barbarism. 18
all oppositions are treated as dangerous and subject to repression, opposition that would be loyal if it were tolerated becomes disloyal because it is not tolerated. Since
all opposition is likely to be disloyal, all opposition
must be repressed." Dahl, Introduction, in Regimes and Oppositions, supra at 1, 13.
1. CT_.D. Bayley, Public Liberties in the New States
75-92 (1964T; V. Chalidze, To Defend These Rights: Human
Rights and the Soviet Union 67-91 (G. Daniels transl. 1974).
15. J. Ingles, Study of Discrimination in respect of
the Right of Everyone to Leave Any Country, Including His
Own, and to Return to His Country 29-30, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/220/Rev.1 (1963). Cf. also V. Chalidze, supra note
14, at 92-114; W. Korey, The Soviet Cage: Anti-Semitism in
Russia 184-200 (1973); A. Sakharov, Sakharov Speaks 159-63
T.-Slisbury ed. 1974).
16. The denationalization and banishment of Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn by the Soviet Union in February,
1974 are of course the most recent dramatic illustration.
For details, see McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, "Nationality
and Human Righ-: The Protection of the Individual in External Arenas," 83 Yale L.J. 900, 959-60 (n. 280) (1974).
17. For a concise account of the figures of political refugees in recent history, see "Refugees," 15 Encyc.
Brit. 568, 569 (15th ed. 1974).
18. In addition to the works concerning torture cited
below, see generally C. Belfrage, The American Inquisition
1945-19'0-(1973); A: Davis, If They Come in the Morning:
Voices of Resistance (1971); M. Djilas, Land Without Justice (1958); C. Goodell, Political Prisoners in America
-1973); 0. Kirchheimer, Political Justice: The Use of Legal
Procedure for Political Ends (1961)1 J. Mitford', The Trial
of Dr. Spock (1969); W. Preston, Aliens and Dissenters:
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The plight of the dissenter goes far beyond the Interferences mentioned above to the enduring of deprivations of
well-being by jailing and torture. On every continent
political dissenters are, as spotlighted in Solzhenitsyn's
recent masterpiece, The Gulag Archipelago, 1 9 imprisoned In
Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933 (1963); B. RuoWang (J. Pasqualini) & R. Chelminski, Prisoner of Mao
(1973); R. Sherrill, Military Justice is to Justice as
Military Music is to Music (1970); United-Nations, Freedom
from Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile (Yearbook on Human Rights: First Supplementary Volume)T(1959); United Nations, Study of the Right of Everyone to be Free f om Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/w26/
Rev.! (1964); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
"Report on the Status of Human Rights in Chile," Doc. OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.34/doc.21 corr.1 (25 October 1974) (Findings of
'on-the-spot' observations in the Republic of Chile, July
22-August 2, 1974); "Hearings on Human Rights In Chile Before the Subcomms. on International Organizations and Movements and on Inter-American Affairs of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs," 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. pts. I & 2 (1974);
"Hearings on Refugee and Humanitarian Problems in Chile Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Problems Connected with
Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,"
93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); "Hearing on Refugee and Humanitarian Problems in Chile Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary," 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974);
"Hearings on Human Rights in South Korea: Implications for
U.S. Policy Before the Subcomms. on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on International Organizations and Movements of
the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs," 93rd Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974); Oberdorfer, "South Korea: The Smothering of Dissent," The Washington Post, July 28, 1974, sec. C, at 3;
Report on an Amnesty International Mission to the Republic
of Korea, 27th March-9th April 1975 (unpublished paper,
1975); Fraser, "Political Repression in 'Free China'" 116
Cong. Rec. E7953-56; Ginsburg, Repression in Taiwan, The
New Republic, July 17, 1971, at 15-16; Peng, "PoliticaOffences in Taiwan: Laws and Problems," 47 The China
Quarterly 471 (1971).
19. A. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956
(T. Whitney transl., 1974). For a brilliant review, see
Lipson, "Book Review," 84 Yale L.J. 952 (1975).
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large numbers in concentration camps, local jails, national
prisons, or other detention centers. 2 0 "Conditions in these
prisons," as Shelton has summarized, "are, needless to say,
usually sub-human and insupportable: Torture, painful
shackling, perennial semi-starvation, and carefully calculated breakdown of prisoner morale are the very grammar and
rhetoric of political detention. ''2 1 Torture, described in
22
a recent study by Amnesty International, as a "cancer,"
2
3
"the most flagrant denial of man's humanity,"
and "the
ultimate human corruption, ''24 has practically become "a
worldwide phenomenon" 2 5 as an instrument of silencing political dissent. In crowning indignity dissenters are on oc6
casion sent to lunatic asylums in the guise of treatment.2
Insofar as wealth processes are concerned, we find
that deprivations against non-conformists increase correspondingly as the public sector expands. As indicated in
a Report of the Committee of Experts under the ILO auspices:
It is in the specific field of public, or
state-controlled, employment that legislative provisions or administrative practice
seem most often liable to run counter to
equality of employment and occupation for
purely political reasons. 2 7
Such discrimination may be manifested in "appointments,
transfers, promotion, allocation of persons to responsible
or confidential positions," as well as in "access to training facilities and to special courses, conditions of em20.
21.
22.
(1973).
23.

24.

Shelton, supra note 5, at 14-19.
Id. at 14.
A-nesty International, Report on Torture 22
Id. at 23.

Td.

25.
Id. at 7. We propose to deal with the problem
of torture-Tn a separate article.
26. See V. Chalidze, supra-note 14, at 247-94;
Reddaway, "The Soviet Treatment of Dissenters and the
Growth of a Civil Rights Movement," in Rights and Wrongs:
Some Essays on Human Rights 79, 92-97, 1-18-20 (C. Hill ed.
1969); Shelton, supra note 5, at 14.
27.
International Labour Conference, Report of the
Committee of Experts on the Appl-ication of Conventions
and Recommendations 218 (1963).
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' 8
ployment and termination of employment.a2
Loyalty tests
may be indiscriminately applied In government employment,
including teaching, even In a body politic that prides Itself of the tradition of democracy. 29 The invidious effect of such a program is underlined by Emerson:
Generally speaking, cutting a person off
from employment or career because of his
beliefs, opinions, or associations has a
grossly inhibiting effect upon the free exercise of expression by that person and by
many others. Where, as in this country,
loyalty qualifications are demanded for a
substantial proportion of available employment, the impact is widespread and deep.
Moreover, certain aspects of loyalty oaths
and loyalty programs magnify the total effect. 3 0
Discrimination against non-conformists Is not, however, confined to the public sector. Even employers in
the private sector are often reluctant to hire those who
are labelled politically undesirable or those whose life
styles are unconventional. 3 1 Confiscation of property is
sometimes imposed upon dissenters. In relation to livelihood, deprivations of skill may take the form of denying
"professional people and artists the right to pursue their
occupations," reducing "countless scientists, historians
and writers," and so on, to do "menial labor." 32
Deprivations against political dissenters extend also
to the intimate world of affection values and institutions.
Harassed by the tactics of asserted "guilt by association,"

28. International Labour Office, Fighting Discrimination in Employment and Occupation 108 (1968).
29. Consult generally R. Brown, Loyalty and Security
(1958); T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression
205-46 (1970); H. Hyman, To Try Men's Souls: Loyalty Tests
in American History (1959); D. Williams, Not in the Public
Interest (1965); Caughey, McCarthyism Rampant, in The Pulse
of Freedom, supra note 9, at 15X-210.
30. T. Emerson, supra note 29, at 207.
31. Fighting Discrimination in Employment and Occupation, supra note 28, at 112.
32. ShWelton, supra note 5, at 14.
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non-conformists often find themselves stifled in social
isolation. They often find it impossible, for reasons beyond their control, to maintain prior congenial personal
relationships or to establish new ones. Fear and anxiety
are manipulated by oppressors in such a way as to frighten
relatives and friends.
In a prevailing atmosphere of fear
and mutual suspicion, non-conformists are made social as
well as political outcasts. They become public and private targets of ridicule, contempt, and shame. With the
consummation of these orchestrated punishments, deprivations of respect and rectitude reach their full potential. 3 3
I.

Basic Community Policies

The differential treatment of individual human beings
entirely on the basis of political and other opinions is
clearly incompatible with the values of human dignity.
Shared respect alone requires freedom from such discrimination. The sharing of power, further, depends upon a free
exchange of opinion; a democratic society can only thrive
by cultivating and testing a great pluralism of ideas and
alternatives.3 4 Any realization of shared enlightenment,
33. Friedrich and Brzezinski describe it in terms of
"Islands of Separateness." See C. Friedrich & Z. Brzezinski,
supra note 3, at 239-89. Aware of the disruptive potential
that may be generated by small challenging groups, totalitarian regimes have generally sought atomization of interpersonal relations of groups below the level of the State.
It may also be of interest to note: "Apart from religion,
the state sometimes imposes purely secular restrictions.
The more totalitarian a government, the more likely it is
to restrict or direct sexual behavior. . . . sex, being a
highly personal and individualistic matter, is recognized
as antithetical to the whole idea of strict governmental
control and supervision of the individual.
This may help
explain the rigid sexual censorship exerted by most totalitarian regimes.
It is as though such a government, being obsessed with power, cannot tolerate the power the sexual impulse exerts on the population."
"Sexual Behavior,
Human," 16 Encyc. Brit. 593, 599 (15th ed. 1974).
See
also J. Hazard, supra note 8, at 121-37; S. Neumann, supra
note 3, at 142-204.
34. Shils offers this apt summary: "Liberalism is a
system of pluralism. It is a system of many centers of
power, many areas of privacy and a strong internal impulse
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likewise, must include broad freedom of political and other
opinion. In a word, abundant production and wide sharing
of all values are profoundly affected by the degree to
which the members of a community enjoy freedom of opinion.
The justification most commonly invoked in support of
discrimination based upon political and other opinions,
like that in support of religious intolerance and persecution, is phrased in terms of the necessities imposed by
the need of maintaining unity, of avoiding community fragmentation in consequence of many diverging views. 3 5 The
allegation of unity may build variously upon asserted needs
of national solidarity against real or imagined external
threat, upon the imperatives of pent-up nationalism, upon
the task of nation-building in a traditional society, or
upon the critical need for economic development, or, more
crudely, upon the latent consolidation of power by an effective ruling elite.3 6 Not infrequently, suppression of
towards the mutual adaptation of the spheres, rather than
of the dominance or the submission of any one to the
others." E. Shils, The Torment of Secrecy 154 (1956). For
a concise overview on pluralism, see Kariel, "Pluralism,"
12 Int'l Encyc. Soc. Sc. 164 (D. s-TTls ed. 1968). Pluralism was championed witF special vigor, in reaction against
the alienation and dehumanization of the individual caused
by excessive capitalism, in the early part of the twentieth
century by a group of writers in England, including
Frederic Maitland, Harold J. Laski, R.H. Tawney, and
G.D.H. Cole. See, e.g., H. Laski, Authority in the Modern
State (1919); R. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society (192)T.
35. In view of the very nature of intolerance, political or religious, Maurice Cranston has observed that "the
argument both for and against political toleration in the
twentieth century cannot be said to have differed greatly
from the debate concerning religious toleration that exercised the minds of earlier generations." Cranston,
Toleration, 8 The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 143, 146
(P. Edwards ed. 1967).
36. Excessive emphasis on this theme often leads to
a misconceived dichotomy of "nation-building" and "human
rights"--i.e., freedoms are a luxury for a developing nation and people preoccupied with the task of nationbuilding. The falsity of such an assertion will become
clear as we deal with other value processes. Nationbuilding is a multi-dimensional task that involves all aspects of national life and all important value-institutions
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dissent is further justified in terms of governmental efficiency, or the maintenance of internal order. 37 The most
dogmatic oppressors of dissent may upon occasion assert a

monopoly of the truth of their proclaimed political orthodoxy, exhibiting a zeal no less intense than that of religious fanatics.3 8
The search for unity through the repression of political opinion would appear to be gravely misconceived.
"There is," Emerson writes, "no fundamental conflict between freedom of expression and national unity or consensus." 39 "It would contradict," he continues, "the basic

tenets of a democratic society to say that the greater the
freedom of expression, the less the area of agreement among
its members." 0 He elaborates:
[A] healthy consensus is possible only where

freedom of expression flourishes.

Such free-

dom is essential to the whole process of
legitimation of social decisions. Suppression

not only is ineffective in promoting general
agreement or stability, but hinders the
process by engendering hostility, resentment,
fear, and other divisive forces. 4 1
Given the diversity and dynamics of the political systems

prevailing in the past, present, and future of human society, any claim to monopolize truth in a particular political doctrine would appear to carry about as much persuasiveness as a comparable claim in the realm of religion.
The strength of a society that honors human dignity must
rest upon genuine pluralism rather than coerced monolithism.4 2 The alleged "conflict" between freedom of opinion
of a body politic; it can be viewed as progress toward a
self-sustaining process of value accumulation and distribution.

Thus, it would be a hollow exercise to talk about

nation-building without high regard to human rights, the
core reference of which is the wide shaping and sharing of

values by community members.
37. Cf. T. Emerson, supra note 29, at 44-46, 97-399.
38. A notable example is of course claims about ultimate orthodoxy of Marxism.
39. T. Emerson, supra note 28, at 44.
40. Id.
41. IW.
42. See note 34 supra.
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and expression and governmental efficiency would, finally,
appear "more apparent than real." 4 3 Again the point is
well made by Emerson: "In the long run, open criticism
of the government's operations results in a more responsible, alert, and fair administration, and hence in more
effective government."'4 4
It is not being suggested that the accommodation ofone individual's freedom of political opinion and expression with the comparable rights of others and the aggregate common interest, especially in the maintenance of
internal public order, is an easy task. Whether the
problem is formulated in terms of a dichotomy of "ex- 6
'4
pression" and "action," 4 5 "clear and present danger,"
43.

T. Emerson, supra note 29, at 45.
Id. at 45-46. For expositions of the policy considerations-underlying freedom of expression, see generally, among others, C. Black, Jr., Perspectives in Constitutional Law 83-93 (1970); Z. Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in
the United States (1941; 1969); T. Emerson, supra 29;
H. Laski, Liberty in the Modern State (-90);
H. Lasswell,
National Security and Individual Freedom (1950); J. Locke,
Two Treaties of Government (P. Laslett ed. 2d ed. 1967);
J. Mill, On Liberty (1859; 1956); J. Milton, Areopagitica
T-;12I) A. Sakharov, Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom (The New York Times transl. 196); D. Sa-ndifer
& L. Scheman, The Foundations of Freedom 69-82 (I196M;
M. Shapiro, Freedom of Speech: The Supreme Court and Judicial Review (1966).
45. T. Emerson, supra note 29, at 8, 17.
In Emerson's words: "The central idea of a system of freedom of
expression is that a fundamental distinction must be drawn
between conduct which consists of 'expression' and conduct
which consists of 'action.' 'Expression' must be freely
allowed and encouraged. 'Action' can be controlled, subject to other constitutional requirements, but not by controlling expression. A system of freedom of expression
cannot exist effectively on any other foundations, and a
decision to maintain such a system necessarily implies acceptance of this proposition." Id. at 17. His expressionaction theory first appeared in Emerson, "Toward a General
Theory of the First Amendment," 72 Yale L.J. 877 (1963),
later published as a paperback: T. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment--66).
46. The famous "clear and present danger" test was
formulated by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919), in which the-6pre
-r---T-e

44.
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48
or "ad hoc balancing, "' 4 9
"bad tendency,"47 "incitement,",
it would appear that the only rational procedure for accommodation is a disciplined, contextual analysis that
takes fully into account all the relevant variables and
evaluates the consequences of available alternatives in the
light of goals, trends, conditions, and projections. For
the purposes of such an inclusive and contextual analysis
it is essential that appropriate principles of content and
procedure be devised and employed to guide and assist in
the making of rational decisions and in the reduction of

United States unanimously sustained a conviction, under
the Espionage Act of 1917, for causing insubordination in
the armed forces.
In the words of Justice Holmes: "[T]he
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in
which it is done. . . . The most stringent protection of
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting
fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even
protect a man from an injunction against uttering words
that may have all the effect of force. . . . The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
-substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
It is a question of proximity and degree."
Id. at 52.
47. E.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.T52 (1925),
especially-at 666-72. Upholding the constitutionality
of a New York statute outlawina "criminal anarchy," the
U.S. Supreme Court said: "That a State in the exercise
of its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom [of speech] by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime,
or disturb the public peace, is not open to question."
Id. at 667.
48. Cf. T. Emerson, supra note 29, at 16, 105, 15657, 314, 32V4, 717-18.
49. See Emerson, "Toward a General Theory of the
First Amendment," 72 Yale L.J. 877, 912-14; T. Emerson,
supra note 29, at Ili6b1
etseq. For further analysis and
comments, see also W. Mendelson, Justices Black and Frankfurter: Conflict in the Court (2d ed. 1966); Frantz, "The
First Amendment in the Balance," 71 Yale L.J. 1424 (1962);
Meiklejohn, "The Balancina of Self-Preservation Against
Political Freedom," 49 Calif. L. Rev. 4 (1961).

YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER

[VOL.2

50

arbitrary elements.
Appropriately characterized as "the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom,"5 1 freedom of opinion and expression is Indeed the
"touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations
is consecrated." 5 2 The destructive impact of deprivations
of this fundamental freedom extends far beyond the direct
victims themselves. In the words of John Stuart Mill,
It is not the minds of heretics that are deteriorated most by the ban. . . . The greatest harm is done to those who are not heretics
and whose whole mental development is cramped
and their reason cowed by the fear of heresy.
No man can be a great thinker who does not
recognize that as a thinker it is his first
duty to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead. Truth gains more even
by the errors of one who, with due study and
preparations thinks for himself than by the
true opinions of those who hold them only because they do not suffer themselves to think. 5 3
In comparable vein, Justice Hugo L. Black said:
50. Consult McDougal, "Human Rights and World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure for Clarifying General Community Policies," 14 Va. J. Int'l L. 387
(1974); McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, "The Protection of Respect and Human Rights: Freedom of Choice and World Public
Order," 24 Am. U. L. Rev. No. 4 (Summer 1975). See also
M. McDougal, H. Lasswell, & J. Miller, The Interpretation
oT Agreements and World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure (1967); Lasswell, "The Public Interest:
Proposing Principles of Content and Procedure," in The
Public Interest 54-79 (C. Friedrich ed. 1962); Lassw--eT,
"Clarifying Value Judgments: Principles of Content and
Procedure," I Inquiry 87 (1958).
51. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937)
(Cardozo, J.).
52. "Annotations on the text of the draft International Covenants on Human Rights" (prepared by the Secretary-General), 10 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 28,
at 50, U.N. Doc. A/2929 (1955).
53. Quoted in D. Sandifer & L. Scheman, supra note

44, at 77.
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Centuries of experience testify that laws
aimed at one political or religious group,
however rational these laws may be in their
beginnings, generate hatreds and prejudice
which rapidly spread beyond control. Too
often it is fear which inspires such passions,
and nothing is more reckless or contagious.
. . . Under such circumstances, restrictions
imposed on proscribed groups are seldom
static, even though the rate of expansion
4
may not move in geometric progression.5

II1.

Trends in Decision

Historically, it must be conceded that the transnational community has afforded individuals but meager protection against discriminations that are grounded on
political or other opinions.
In the rare instances in
which the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has been
54. American Communications Association v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 448 (1950) (Justice Black's Dissenting
opinion).
On a more positive note, the importance of the
freedom of expression and freedom from discrimination on
account of opinions cannot be overemphasized. Justice
William 0. Douglas has written: "Full and free discussion
keep a society from becoming stagnant and unprepared for
the stresses and strains that work to tear all civilizations apart. Full and free discussion has indeed been the
first article of our faith." Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494,
584 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
Similarly, an Oriental
philosopher writes: "In order to contribute fully to the
society, each individual should have the fullest degree of
self-expression. Social progress depends on each individual's freedom of expression." Lo, "Human Rights in the
Chinese Tradition," in Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations 186, 189 (UNESCO ed. 1949).
Emerson summarizes: "Maintenance of a system of
free expression is necessary (1) as assuring individual
self-fulfillment, (2) as a means of attaining the truth,
(3) as a method of securing participation by the members
of the society in social, including political, decisionmaking, and (4) as maintaining the balance between stability and change in the society."
Emerson, supra note 49,

at 878-79.
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invoked, since groups protected have in fact been characterized by a complex of religious, racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or political factors, it is highly probable that some groups have exhibited highly distinctive
political opinions.5 5 Similarly, the earlier transnational protection of minority groups during the era of the
League of Nations could not but protect non-conformist
views when the particular racial, religious, or linguistic
groups held distinctive, non-conforming political opinions.5 6 From a somewhat different perspective, it may be
observed that freedom from discrimination on account of
political or other opinion was, not insignificantly, protected in the instances in which people were given opportunity, through plebiscites or comparable arrangements, to
express their political preferences and to choose their
affiliations before a transfer of territory was consummated. 5 7
In projecting its general norm of non-discrimination,
the United Nations Charter is relatively short in its illustrative list of impermissible grounds of differentiation: "race, sex, language, or religion."5 8 The context
suggests that the framers of the Charter and their audience shared the expectation that more detailed and elaborate provisions for the global protection of human rights
would soon find place in a contemplated International Bill
of Rights. 5 9 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
55. See M. Ganji, International Protection of Human
Rights 39-VT(1962); McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, supra
note 50.
56. Cf. McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, supra note 50.
57. S-e H. Johnson, Self-Determination-Within the
-Nations (1967); J. Mattern, The Employment of
Community
the Plebiscite in the Determinatio-oT-Sovereignty (1920);
S. Wambaugh, A Monograph on Plebiscites (1920); S. Wambaugh,
Plebiscites Since the World War (1933); Chen & Reisman,
"Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title," 81
Yale L.J. 599, 660-69 (1972).
U.N. Charter, Arts. 1(3), 13()(b), 55(c), and
58.
76(c).
59. L. Goodrich, E. Hambro & A. Simons, Charter of
the United Nations: Commentary and Documents 371-74 (3d
& rev. ed. 1969).
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presently made it clear that the itemization of impermissible grounds of differentiation in the Charter was
indeed illustrative, not exhaustive. In Article 2 of the
Declaration the itemization is expanded as follows:
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other
status. 60
The comprehensiveness of this itemization is strengthened
by Article 7, which accords "equal protection of the law"
to "all" against "any discrimination" and "any incitement
to such discrimination.,'6 1 Further substance is added to
freedom from discrimination because of political or other
opinion in Article 19:
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion
and expression; this right includes freedom
to hold opinions without interference and to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas 6
through any media and regardless of frontiers. 2
The same theme is stressed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Adopting the wording
of Article 2 of the Universal Declaration, the Covenant,
in Article 2(1), specifies "political or other opinion" as
6
among the impermissible grounds of differentiation. 3 Individuals, pursuant to Article 26, are further accorded
access to law to challenge any such discrimination:
All persons are equal before the law and
are entitled without any discrimination
'to the equal protection of the law. In
this respect, the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political
60. Unite-d" Nations, Human Rights: A Compilation of
International Instruments of the United Nations 1, U.N.
Doc. ST/HR/I (1973) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Human Rights
Instruments].

61.

1d.

62.
63.

IT. at 2.
Td. at 8.
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or other opinion, national or social origin,
64
property, birth or other status.
As in the Universal Declaration, freedom from discrimination because of opinions, political or other, finds its
deepest support in a prescribed basic freedom of opinion
and expression. Article 19 of the Covenant stipulates
that "Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference" 6 5 and "the right to freedom of expression," includinq "freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art,
or through any other media of his choice. ' 6 The exercise
of this right is, not inappropriately, made subject, In
paragraph 3, to such "restriction" as "provided by law and
are necessary" for "respect of the rights or reputations
of others" and for "the protection of national security or
of public order (ordre public), or of public health or
morals." 6 7 The Internatiohal Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights, similarly, specifically forbids, in
Article 2(2), discriminations on the ground of opinions,
political or other, in regard to the rights protected In
68
the Covenant.
The Proclamation of Teheran, emanating from the International Conference on Human Rights in 1968, is emphatic in its reaffirmation of freedom from discrimination on
the ground of opinion. Observing that discriminations because of "expressions of opinion" "outrage the conscience
of mankind and endanger the foundations of freedom, justice and peace in the world," 6 9 the Proclamation considers
it imperative, for "the achievement of each individual of
the maximum freedom and dignity,",7 0 that "the members of
the international community fulfil their solemn obligations to promote and encourage respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all" without distinctions on
such grounds as "political or other opinions." 7 1
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

70.
71.

Id.
4T.
Td.
-1.
T-d.
Id.

at 11.
[Art.
[Art.
[Art.
at 4.
at 19

19(1)].
19(2)1.
19(3)].
(para. 11).

'i
. at 18 (para. 5).
"F. (para. 1).
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In certain human rights conventions, with more restricted focus, discrimination on the basis of political or
other opinions is also proscribed. Thus, the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention prohibits, in
Article 1, any "distinction, exclusion, limitation or preference" on account of "political opinion" that "has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or
treatment in employment or occupation."7 2 The Convention
against Discrimination in Education prohibits, in Article
1, any "distinction, exclusion, limitation or preference"
based on "political or other opinion" which "has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing equality of
treatment in education."! 3 'Similarly, the Employment Policy Convention, adopted by the General Conference of the
International Labour Organization in July 1964, seeks to
ensure, in Article 1(2), "freedom of choice of employment
and the fullest possible opportunity for each worker to
qualify for, and to use his skills and endowments in, a
job for which he is well suited," without distinction on
such grounds as "political opinion."7 4 The Genocide Convention, finally, through the protection it extends to
"national, ethnical, racial or religious" groups could be
made to protect qroups with distinctive political opinions. 7 5 Group identifications under all these labels are
often less than clear cut.
On the regional level, the double emphasis on freedom
from discrimination because of opinions, political or other,
and freedom of expression is equally evident. Thus, the
European Convention on Human Rights includes "political or
other opinion" among te impermissible arounds of differentiation in Article j476 and provides the core freedom of
expression in Article 10.77 The American Convention on
72. Id. at 29.
73. I-d. at 31.
74. Id. at 88.
75. Id. at 41.
76. Ba'sic Documents on International Protection of
Human Rightsi130 (L. Sohn & T. Buergenthal eds. 1973).
77. Article 10 reads: "(1) Everyone has the right
to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority
and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises.
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Human Rights obliges the contracting parties to "respect
the rights and freedoms" provided in the Convention and to
"ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the
free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms" without any discrimination for such reasons as "political or
other opinion."7 8 The "right" of everyone to "freedom of
thought and expression" is given detailed formulation in
Article 13.79
The same double emphasis on freedom from discrimination on account of political or other opinions and freedom
of expression is carried forward on the national level, as
demonstrated in many national constitutions. The protection of freedom from discrimination because of opinions is
variously sought by general incorporation of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in the constitution, 8 0 by gen(2) The exercise of these freedoms,
since It carries
with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary In a democratic society,
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, for the protection
of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary."
Id. at 129.
78. -Td. at 210 [Art. 1(1)].
79. ITd. at 214-5.
80. The Constitutions of the members of the French
Community are especially noteworthy in this regard. For
example, the Constitution of the Republic of Senegal of
1963 proclaims, in the preamble, that "The Senegalese
people hereby solemnly proclaims its independence and its
attachment to the fundamental rights as defined by the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789
and by the Universal Declaration of December 10, 1948."
1 A. Peaslee, Constitutions of Nations 697, 697 (rev. 3d
ed. 1965).
See also Constitution of the Federal Republic
of Cameroon,'l1961, Art. 1, id. at 34, 34; Constitution
of the Republic of Chad, 196, Preamble, id. at 65, 65;
Constitution of the Republic of the Congo-Brazzaville),
1963, Preamble, id. at 85, 85; Constitution of Dahomey,
1964, Preamble, -id.at 151, 151; Constitution of the Republic of Gabon,_T961, Preamble, id. at 194, 194; Consti-
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eral provision of equality or non-discrimination without 8
1
specification of impermissible grounds of differentiation,
or by specific inclusion of political or other opinions
among the impermissible grounds of differentiation. Such
specifications include the following references: "p1oliti'8
cal or other opinion,118 2 "political opinions," 3 "political
4 "opinion[s],"'8 5 "creed,",8 6 and "political or
belief,
'8
social opinion." 7
tution of the Ivory Coast, 1960, Preamble, id. at 242, 242;
Constitution of the Republic of Madagascar, I959, Preamble,
id. at 456, 456; Constitution of Niger, 1960, Preamble, id.
a-t 578, 578; and Constitution of Upper Volta, 1960, Preai-le,
id. at 1012, 1012.
E.g., Constitution of Tunisia, 1959, Art. 6. id.
81.
at 909, 910;-Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica,
1949, as amended to 1963, Art. 33, 4 A. Peaslee (1970),
supra note 80, at. 328, 333; Constitution of Ecuador, 1967,
Art. 4, id. at 460, 460.
82.-E.g., Constitution of Bolivia, 1967, Art. 6, 4
A. Peaslee, supra note 80, at 100, 101.
83.TE.g., Constitution of Kenya, 1963, Art. 26(3), 1
A. Peaslee, supra note 80, at 257, 276; Constitution of
Malawi, 1964, Art. 23(3), id. at 476, 492-93: Constitution
of Nigeria, 1963, Art. 28(T-, id. at 592, 606; Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1961, Arf-. 11, id. at 715, 719; Constitution of Tanganyika, 1962, Preambl-e, id. at 860, 860;
Constitution of Uganda, 1962, Art. 29(3), id. at 921, 938;
Constitution of Zambia, 1964, Art. 25(3), Ti. at 1027,
1042; The Constitution of Barbados, 1966, A-rt. 23(2), 4
A. Peaslee, supra note 80, at 31, 47; Constitution of the
Republic of Guatemala, 1965, Art. 43, id. at 564, 571.
84. E.g., The Constitution of the-Republic of Ghana,
Art. 1, 1 A-Peaslee, supra note 80, at 213, 213.
85. E.g., Constitution of Somalia, 1960, Art. 3, id.
at 776, 777; -Constitution of Togo, 1963, Art. 6, id. at
890, 891.
86. E.g., Constitution of the United Arab Republic,
id. at 991, 994.
1964, Art. W,
87. E.g., Constitution of Libya, 1951, as amended in
1962 and 19-, Art. 11, id. at 436, 437. In recent times
some of these Constitutions have been suspended or changed.
In a crisis-ridden world, chanqes both favorable and unfavorable to the protection of political freedoms must be
expected. For some of these changes, see 1 A. Peaslee,
-
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The comprehensiveness of these national constitutional
provisions was foreshadowed in the legislative history of
Article 2 (the non-discrimination clause) of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which, it may be recalled, has
become a prototype for the comparable provisins in many
other contemporary human rights instruments. 0 This legislative history amply establishes that the term "political
or other opinions" was intended to refer to views not only
about the shaping and sharing of power but about other components of the social process. From the beginning when the
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities was engaged, in November 1947, in the
task of formulating a draft Universal Declaration, Mr.
Masani (India) proposed that "political opinion" be included among the impermissible grounds of differentiation
in the non-discrimination glause (then draft Article 6,
and ultimately Article 2). 9 His reasoning was that the
future problems of discrimination "would be more in the
nature of political minorities than the traditional religious minorities, which were tendinq to disappear." 9 0
Mr. Spanien (France) suggested, invoking the wording
"opinions" contained in Professor Rene Cassin's original
draft,9 1 that the adjective "political" be dropped so that
the very comprehensiveness of its intended reference would
not be misconstrued. 92 In appreciation of this deep concern, the final wording, as suggested by Mr. McNamara
(Australia), was "political or other opinion." 9 3
It is worth noting that some of the older prescriptions developed by the international community about refugees and asylum can be employed to mitigate the plight of
political dissenters.9 4 When such dissenters find themConstitutions of Nations (rev. 4th ed. 1974) at 308; 433,
436; 623; 722; 926; 984'; 1000.
88. See McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, supra note 49.
89. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/Sr.4, at 2-(19-47).
90. Id. at 6.
91. T-d. at 5.
92. Id. at 5-6.
93. Td. at 7, 12-13.
94. See oenerally M. Garcia-Mora, International Law
and Asylum as a Human Right (1956); A. Grahl-Madsen, The
Status of Refugees in International Law (1966, 1972);L. Holborn, The International Refuqee Organization, A Soeciaiz-e Agency of the United Nations: Its History and Work,
946-955(T1l5.6); F. Norwood, Stranqers and-Exiles (1969);
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selves the targets of discrimination and of threats of
more severe deprivation they often seek security in other
lands. There has been continuous transnational effort,
beginning in 1921 under the League of Nations and extending through the United Nations system under the auspices
of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, toward improving the status and treatment of
those who flee their country in fear of persecution because of political opinions or other grounds. 95 Thus,
while side-stepping the prior question of whether refugees
are to be accorded a right of asylum under international
law, the Convention Rglating to the International Status
of Refugees of 19 3 3 90 and the Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees of 1951,97 whose scope of application
J. Schechtman, The Refugee in the World: Displacement and
Integration (1963); S. Sinha, Asylum and International Law
(1971); J.Stoessinger, The Refugees and the World Community (1956); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, A Mandate to Protect and Assist Refugees (1971);
Evans, "The Political Refugee in United States Immigration
Law and Practice," 3 Int'l Lawyer 92 (1969); Krenz, "The
Refugee as a Subject of International Law," 15 Int'l &
Comp. L.Q. 90 (1966); Read, "The United Nations and--Refugees: Changing Concepts," 537 Int'l Conciliation (1962);
Rees, "Century of the Homeless Man," 515 Int'l Conciliation (1957); Weis, "The Concept of the Refugee in Internaional Law," [1960] Journal du droit -international 928
et seq.; Weis, "The International Protection of Refugees,"
VT AJL 193 (1954).
95. See especially A Mandate to Protect and Assist
Refugees, supra note 93; L. Holborn, supra note 94; Read,
supra note 9-; Van Heuven Goldhart, "The Problem of Refugee--Il 82 Hague Recueil 265 (1953).
96. 159 L.N.T.S. 199; the Convention was signed at
Geneva on October 28, 1933.
97. The Convention was adopted by the United Nations
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees
and Stateless Persons, convened in July 1951 at Geneva
under General Assembly Resolution 429(V) of 14 December
1950. It has been in effect since April 22, 1954. For
its text see 189 U.N.T.S. 137; U.N. Human Riqhts Instruments, supra note 0, at 66-73. For a commentary, see
Weis, The International Protection of Refuqees, 48 AJL
193 (1954).
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has been significantly expanded by the adoption of the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1967,98 offer
an abundance of provisions about the treatment of refugees.9 9
The reluctance to confront the question of asylum has derived, understandably, from deference to the sensitivity of
state elites in relation to political dissenters and refugees.
The first significant attempt to remedy this basic inadequacy in prescription was manifested in 1948 in the Universal Declaration of Human Riqhts, Article 14 of which
provides that "Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy
in other countries asylum from persecution." 10 0 Although
the critical wording, "enjoy" instead of "be qranted," is
commonly recognized as weak, 10 1 this prescription unmistak98. 606 U.N.T.S. 267; U.N. Human Rights Instruments,
supra note 60, at74-75. In effect since October 4, 1967,
the Protocol has sought wider protection of refugees by removing the temporal and geographic limitations inherent in
the 1951 Refugees Convention. For a detailed treatment,
see Weis, "The 1967 Protocol Relatina to the Status of Refugees and Some Questions of the Law of Treaties," 42 Brit.
Y.B. Int'l L. 39 (1969).
99. For a comparison with the treatment accorded
stateless persons, see McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, supra
note 16, at 977-81.--A refugee, in the popular U.N. parlance derived
from the 1951 Refugee Convention, refers to "any person"
who "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country; or.who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence
as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwillina to return to it."
Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees, 1951, Art. I(A)(2), U.N. Human
Rights Instruments, supra note 60, at 67. See also Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, ArtF-E Iid. at 74.
100. U.N. Human Rights Instruments, supra note-60, at 2.
101.
N. Robinson, The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights 119-23 (2d ed., 1958); A. Verdoodt, Naissance et
Signification de ]a Declaration Universelle des Droits de
l'homme 150-5 (1964).
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ably signifies a deep community concern to transform the
matter of asylum from the realm of "state discretion" to
that of international humanitarian concern. Regrettably
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
fails to incorporate even a comparable, much less a
stronger, provision. This deficiency has in part been
remedied by the adoption of the Declaration on Territorial
Asylum by the General Assembly of the United Nations in
December 1967,102 in clear recognition of the ever increasing importance of affording asylum to the politically persecuted. This Declaration, in Article 1(1), provides:
Asylum granted by a State, in the exercise of
its sovereignty, to persons entitled to invoke article 14 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, including persons struggling
against colonialism, shall be respected by all
other States.1 0 3
Individuals thus protected shall not, according to Article
3(1), be "subjected to measures suc-chas rejection at the
frontier or, if he has already entered the territory in
which he seeks asylum, expulsion or compulsory return to
any State where he may be subjected to persecution. ''104
It may require underlining that the effective and ult-imate protection of freedom from discrimination on account of political or other opinions rests upon'the realization of many related rights, which, though not directly
applicable in a particular instance, have significant bearing upon aggregate protection. Notable amona such rights
are freedom of assembly and association, 10 5 freedom from
torture and other inhuman treatment,1 0 6 freedom of personal
102. G.A. Res. 2312, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 81,
U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967).
Its text is reprinted in U.N.
Human Rights Instruments, supra note 60, at 77-78. For a
detailed analysis, see Weis,--"1Recent Developments in the
Law of Territorial AS7lum," 7 Canadian Y.B. Int'l L. 92

(1969).
78.

103.

U.N. Human Rights Instruments, supra note 60, at

104. Id.
105. E.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art.
20, U.N. Human Rights Instruments, supra note 60, at 2; International Covenant on Civil and Political Riahts, Arts.
21 and 22, id. at 11.
106. fE.., Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Art. 5, id.--I 1; International Covenant on Civil and
Politica--Rights, Art. 7, id. at 9.
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security, 10 7 due process of law, 1 08 the right to participate
in the political process, 10 9 the right to education, 1 10 and
the right "freely to participate in the cultural life of
l l These rights, as will be elaborated in
the community. 1 'l
detail in appropriate contexts, are protected in numerous
universal and retransnational human rights instruments,
1 12
gional, general and specific.
It is relevant to note, finally, that there has been a
conspicuous lack of demand, comparable to that in relation
to the elimination of racial, sex-based and religious discrimination, by state officials for the making of a special
declaration or convention banning discrimination on account
of political or other opinions. This conspicuous omission
does not of course signify that this problem is unimportant
for human dignity values; such importance is, as already
outlined, abundantly clear. Official reluctance stems, understandably, from the very fact that the established power
elites of the states simply have no desire to see their own
positions weakened by subjecting themselves to elaborate
prescription under which they might be obvious and primary
offenders. What is at stake in needed prescription is precisely the very core of the power processes within the respective national communities. Hence there is cogency In
Falk's proposal that there be established "an international
107. E.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Art. 9, id.-at-l; International Covenant on Civil and
Political-Rights, Arts. 9 and 10, id. at 9.
108. E.g., Universal Declarai-'-on of Human Rights,
Arts. 8, 10, and 11, id. at 1-2; International Covenant
on Civil and PoliticaT-Rights, Arts. 14 and 15, id. at 10.
109. E.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Art. 21, id. at 2; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Art. 25, id. at 11.
110. E.g., Universal De-claration of Human Rights,
Art. 26, id. at 3; International Covenant on Economic,
Social anW-Cultural Rights, Art. 13, id. at 5.
Ill. Universal Declaration of HUi7an Rights, Art.
27(1), id. at 3. See also International Covenant on Economic, ocial and Cultural Rights, Art. 15, id. at 6.
112. See especially the chapter relatiigto the
shaping and-saring of power (in forthcoming Human Rights
and World Public Order).
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committee organized along the lines of the Red Cross, to
deal with the problems of political repression," desiqned
"as a complement to the work being done by Amnesty International and other organizations. 1 1 3 Observing that "the
subject of political repression is one on which aovernments
are not to be trusted as the most reliable actors," 11 4 Falk
stresses the critical need of having "a nongovernmental
actor with a great deal of stature in the world which is
concerned not with the plight of particular individual prisoners of conscience, but with the general situation of repression, an organization which prepares authoritative reports on short notice, recommends action, and tries to gain
access to the societies where these situations exist."ll5
With political discrimination and persecution showing no
signs of abatement, Falk's proposal merits serious consideration.
IV.

Future Developments

The question remains of the future of freely exchanged
controversial opinion in the world community. Any disciplined expectation must rest, in part, upon an analysis of
factors that have worked for or against freedom of expres-sion in the past. Will future circumstances favor one set
of conditioning factors over another and tip the changing
balance of effective public policy in a predictable direction? Will new elements enter the global arena and exert
a decisive influence over the outcome?
Enough has been cleaned from a brief review of the
past to emphasize the relatively recent and precarious
deference and defense that have been given to opinions
that contravene the doctrines, formulas and folklore of
an established order. 1 16 The devastation in Western Europe
113. "Hearings on International Protection of Human
Rights Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations
and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs," 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., at 248 (1973).
114.
Id. at 249.
115. -1 . at 248-49.
116. The recent tragic events, including the largescale arrest and imprisonment of opposing political leaders in the name of national security, in India, the world's
most populous democracy, bear compelling testimony to the
fragility of the protection of political non-conformists.
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that accompanied the bipolar confrontation between Protestants and Catholics eventually generated an accommodation
that substitute a limited degree of toleration for outright coercion. In varying degree, secular conflicts have
taken the place of religious contradictions. In the global community of the future it may be possible, we suggest, to maintain a sufficiently harmonious or ambiguous
situation to permit the pluralizing diversity of world interdependence to work itself out, and incidentally to
strengthen a growing unity of demand for protected freedom of opinion.
Interdependence does not, however, spread automatic
acquiescence in or support for unpopular views. In the immediate future local pockets and larger regions will probably continue as battlegrounds among programmatic groups
who mobilize coercive instruments for the suppression of
dissent. The critical factors may be exceptionally rapid
or unequal change in political, economic, religious and
other relationships; and the dissolution of belief in the
beneficial consequences of maintaining a forum for the exchange of opinions of every kind.
The implications for the policy initiatives of all
members of the world community who support freedom of opinion are evident. The friends of freedom must generate and
sustain unceasing activity on behalf of the theory and practice of open and diverse expression. Officials and private
persons, governmental and private organizations, must be
perpetual targets of praise or blame, reward and punishment,
for the role that they play as defenders or assaulters of
free opinion. Active assistance must go to the victims of
suppression regardless of their location or social position.
The channels of education and information must celebrate the
The events demonstrate the difficulties in the application
of both transnational and national prescriptions. Despite
the still murky information about these events, enough is
known to raise grave questions about the necessity and proportionality of the measures taken in reference to national
security. See N.Y. Times, June 13, 1975, at 1, col. I
(city ed.);-Td., June 27, 1975, at 1, cols. 6 & 8; id.,
June 28, 197T, at 1, col. 6; id., June 29, 1975, at-T, col.
5; id., June 30, 1975, at 1, cZo1. 8; id., July 1, 1975, at
1, EO1. I.
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contributions made to contemporary problem-solving by past
dissenters, and do all possible to nullify regressive manifestations of "political barbarism."
In tradition-bound societies an effective barrier exists in practice between freedom of opinion pertaining to
village matters and opinions about national or transnational relations. It is frequently remarked that the old-style
peasant has no conception that his business is national
business. The vaguely inclusive world "up there" seems to
operate on a mysterious dynamic of its own, rarely affected
by the prayers or curses of the villager. In a technologically interactive global community the pre-conditions are
ever more widely spread for the populace to acquire "pride
of opinion" on issues both large and small. The expeditors
of change cannot wisely assume that protected freedom of
opinion will easily triumph. Nonetheless, the inference
Is possible that the future can be at least partially shaped
in harmony with the requirements of a free forum for the
dissemination and voluntary evaluation of controversial
opinions in the world exchange.

